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PROPERTY AND PERSONAL PRIVACY:
INTERRELATIONSHIP,
ABANDONMENT AND CONFUSION
IN THE PATH OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW
KENNETH MOTT* AND LOVETTE MOTT**

The constitutional right of privacy has a textually-rooted tradition. Until recently, the notion was directly linked to a property
standard and subsumed generally under the fourth and, to a lesser
extent, the fifth amendment. The modern Supreme Court has
abandoned this narrow textual basis in favor of a more general
principle, one identified with the infinitely maleable term, "liberty." On the surface, this change appears to promote the expansion of protected personal rights against governmental
encroachment. However, an examination of current cases reveals
that this ostensible expansion, in fact, has not occurred. A return to
a property-related understanding of privacy will in fact furnish a
much stronger weapon in defense of these rights.
THE BACKGROUND

Throughout American history, judges reviewing the constitutionality of laws have debated and variously decided the question of
whether to confine their inquiry to norms derived from the written
Constitution or to principles of liberty and justice located beyond
the document. Over time, three forms of extra-constitutional
sources have been invoked in judicial review. The first and purest
of these forms is the invocation of general principles of natural justice, which are thought to limit legislative authority quite independent of the terms (or even the existence) of a written constitution.'
This approach was quite common in our early history and while vestiges of it occasionally recur, it has been largely superseded by the
second type of review.
* B.A., Franklin Marshall College; M.A. Leigh University; Ph.D., Brown
University.

** B.A., Gettysburg College; J.D., Dickinson School of Law.
1. See generally Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional
Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247 (1914); Corwin, The "HigherLaw" Background of

American Constitutional Law, 42 HARv. L. REV. 149, 365 (1928-29). See also
Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution? 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
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The dominant form of review since the middle of the last century has been the doctrine of substantive due process. 2 Courts have
found in the due process clause, and in the law of the land clauses of
state and federal constitutions, general authority to protect against
legislative infringement those individual rights which they judge to
be fundamental. Because these clauses do not specify the normative content of the basic rights in question, courts are required to
look beyond the express language of the clauses to their legislative
history and to the dictates of reason in order to interpret and apply
them.
The third form of review involves judicial application of contemporary norms or values as restraints upon legislative power to
certain clauses of the Constitution where the framers of the Constitution would have seen such clauses as embodying different, flexible standards.3 The clearest example of this practice is the
prevailing doctrine that the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment is to be read in the light of evolving standards of decency. 4 Another use of this doctrine is the application of "community standards" in measuring obscenity against the protection of
expression. 5 This notion of a "living Constitution" is distinguished
from the essentially harmless and uncontroversial concept of the
living Constitution that provides courts with the opportunity to apply norms or principles the framers laid down to new or changed
factual circumstances the framers did not forsee without resort to
constitutional amendment.
Unfortunately, by reaching beyond a simple interpretation of
specific constitutional text,6 courts have become vulnerable to several lines of criticism. One criticism has been that however highsounding the names that judges give to these unwritten principles
2. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 30, 369 (1964) (freedom of the entire
university community to be devoid of governmental intervention); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1960) (freedom to associate and to keep membership
lists private); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate
one's child as one chooses); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to
teach a foreign language).
3. See infra notes 4 & 5 for examples of this third form of review.
4. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 661 (1962). The Court held that it
would be "cruel and unusual punishment" to imprison a person for being an
addict by status alone without the presence of a correlating criminal act. Id at
667. Compare Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (finding that the housing
of two inmates in a cell designed for a single inmate does not violate the cruel
and unusual punishment clause), with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)
(failure of prison authorities to provide for prison inmate's medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
5. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 58-77 for an analysis of the modern
Supreme Court and its apparent predilections for non-textual review in the
area of personal privacy.
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which are thought to override a statute, these doctrines are not
legal principles. Judges, therefore, arguably have no superior ability to ascertain their contents than does a popularly elected
legislature.
Other grounds for attack have been that non-textual judicial
review has historically produced bad results. Typically, the cases of
Dred Scott v. Sandford7 and Lochner v. New York 8 have been cited
to show what an injurious impact this approach to decision-making
can have on the country. The Court itself has been critical of its
earlier stand. Finally, the very legitimacy of this form of review has
been questioned. The Constitution does not explicitly authorize
non-textual review, nor does it prohibit it. Ironically, the question
itself is one of constitutional interpretation.
In spite of the controversy surrounding non-textual review, it is
apparent that the Supreme Court has utilized this approach from
the beginning. For the generation that framed the Constitution, the
concept of a "higher law," protecting "natural rights," which should
take precedence over ordinary positive law as a matter of political
obligation, was widely shared and deeply felt.9 Although an essential element of American constitutionalism was the reduction of
some natural rights to written form, it was generally recognized
that written constitutions could not completely codify the higher
law. Thus, in the framing of the original American constitutions, it
was widely accepted that unwritten, but still binding, principles of
higher law remained. The ninth amendment, protecting other
rights not specifically embodied in the Constitution, is the textual
expression of this idea.
Just as it was accepted that the judiciary had the power to enforce the commands of the written Constitution when these mandates conflicted with ordinary law, it was also widely assumed that
judges would enforce as constitutional restraints the unwritten natural rights as well. The practice of the Marshall Court and many of
its contemporary state courts, and the writings of the leading constitutional commentators during the early period of our history, confirm this understanding. 10
7.
8.
9.
mantly

19 How.
198 U.S.
See, e.g.,
declared

393 (1856).
45 (1905).
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385 (1798). Justice Chase adathat "[t]here are certain vital principles in our free Republican

governments, which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant

abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injustice by positive law; or
to take away that security for personal liberty, or privateproperty, for the protection whereof the government was established." Id. at 388 (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). In Fletcher,Justice Marshall flirted with a natural law-vested rights approach as an alternative
means for invalidating Georgia's attempt to revoke a land grant. Id. Justice
Johnson's concurrence repudiated any reliance on the contract clause of the
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A parallel development during the first half of the 19th century
was the frequent attachment of unwritten constitutional principles
to the more vague and general clauses of the state and federal constitutions."1 Natural-rights reasoning in constitutional adjudication
persisted up to the Civil War, particularly with respect to property
and contract rights, and to the "due process" and "law of the land"
clauses. At the same time, an important wing of the anti-slavery
movement developed a natural-rights constitutional theory, built
around concepts of due process and human equality proclaimed in
the Declaration of Independence. 12 This movement provided a
formative theory underlying the due process, equal protection, and
privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment was thus properly viewed as
a reaffirmation and reenactment in positive law of the principle
that fundamental human rights have constitutional status.
The late 19th century, the most controversial phase in our history of unwritten constitutional law, witnessed aggressively devel3
oping constitutional principles to protect "liberty of contract.'
This doctrine protected against labor regulations and restrained
taxation and private business' regulation of prices. The sharp reaction to this judicial practice marked the beginning of a sustained
intellectual and political attack on the whole concept of unwritten
constitutional principles. Under the combined assault of social and
intellectual forces, courts eventually retreated from the doctrines
14
of "economic due process," and finally abandoned it in the 1930's.
Constitution and instead, he relied on the nature and reason of things. Id. at 4348. See also Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815) (state statute violated
"principles of natural justice").
11. See Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175 (1864). In Gelpcke, Justice Swayne refused to follow the latest state supreme court interpretation of a
state's own constitution, declaring that "the plainest principles of justice" prevented the state from nullifying a municipal bond obligation which was valid
when written. Id. at 206-07. Similarly, in Loan Association v. City of Topeka, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874), Justice Miller invalidated a municipal ordinance
which had approved taxation to support the issuance of bonds to promote private industry. Al. Miller stated that "[t]here are rights in every free government beyond the control of the state," and that there are "limitations on such
[governmental] power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments." I& at 662-63.
12. See generally Nelson, The Impact of the Anti Slavery Movement upon
Styles of JudicialReasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARv. L. REV.
513, 521-32 (1974).
13. See Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), where the Supreme Court
invalidated a Louisiana statute because it infringed upon the liberty to contract
for insurance, thus violating the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id,
14. See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), where the Supreme
Court reversed itself and permitted minimum wage legislation. See also United
States v. Carolina Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), where the Supreme Court
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Interestingly, almost simultaneously with the doctrines protecting the laissez-faire economy fading from judicial review, the
judiciary began actively developing new civil libertarian constitutional rights whose protection were deemed "essential to the concepts of ordered liberty." For example, freedom of speech and
religion, 15 rights to "fundamentally fair" proceedings, 16 and rights
to familial autonomy in child-rearing and education 17 were judicially protected at the expense of state regulation. The present generation has seen the greatest development of constitutional rights
not clearly derived from simple textual interpretation, most notably the right to vote, the right to travel, the right of privacy, and
generally the rights resulting from application of "equal protection
of the laws" to the federal government.' 8 The intellectual framework upon which these rights have developed is theoretically different from the founding fathers' natural-rights tradition. Its
rhetorical reference points are Anglo-American tradition and basic
American ideals, rather than human nature, the social contract, or
the rights of man. Yet, this development, in a direct and traceable
line of descent, is essentially the modern offspring of the naturalrights tradition that is so deeply embedded in our constitutional
origins.
TEXTUAL SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY: THE TRADITION

In Boyd v. United States,19 the Supreme Court broadly found
that all governmental attempts to seize a person's private papers
were unconstitutional under both the reasonableness clause of the
fourth amendment and the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
announced that it would uphold an economic regulation if any state of facts
either known or reasonably inferred provided support for the legislative action.
15. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (court declared state
criminal syndicalism act unconstitutional as punishing mere advocacy); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state cannot constitutionally apply eligibility
provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his or her religious convictions respecting their Sabbath).
16. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (prosecution's comment on defendant's failure to take the stand was held a constitutional violation
of due process rights).
17. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate
one's child as one sees fit).
18. See, e.g., Frontier v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (right of female
member of the armed forces to claim her spouse as "dependent"); Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote). The court held that
"wealth of fee paying has ...
no relation to voting qualification; the right to
vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned." Id. at
670. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to marital privacy); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (state law punishing citizens
who bring indigents into the state struck down as unconstitutional violation of
right to travel).
19. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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amendment. In that landmark case, the Court assumed that personality and the "privacies of life" were equated with the individual's inviolate property rights. Thus, the Court concluded that even
a warrant or subpoena satisfying the probable cause and particularity requirements of the fourth amendment could not validate the
use of private papers over the owner's objections in a trial.20 Justice
Bradley's opinion also successfully linked the Constitution to natural rights the common law secured and thereby created a defense in
favor of an individual's sphere of privacy-a sphere composed of
property rights and the privileges against self-incrimination.
Later cases, however, did not provide the breadth of protection
for personal privacy which a literal reading of Boyd seemed to require. In early years of the 20th century, the Court began to limit
Boyd's application by stressing the personal nature of the protections and refusing to extend them to corporations.2 1 The Court
held that an individual could not assert a fifth amendment privilege
against the use of papers which he no longer owned because of a
transfer of title brought about in bankruptcy proceedings. 22 The
Court also rejected plaintiffs' claims that, as custodians of corporate
documents, they had protection in relation to materials the corporation owned.23 The Court again moved toward greater personal privacy protection, however, in Weeks v. United States.24 The Court's
opinion reflected a property orientation consistent with that of
25
Boyd.

Weeks, which concerned a marshall's trespass, revived the ear26
lier constitutionally-based exclusionary rule in a new form.
27
Seven years later, in Gouled v. United States, a unanimous Court
rested its decision to exclude a prosecutor's effort to introduce private papers into evidence upon Boyd's holding that property in
which the government could not assert paramount common law
property rights was absolutely immune from search and seizure. 28
By 1925, the textual underpinnings of the fourth and fifth amendments had furnished the sources of constitutional protection for in20. Id. at 638.

21. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
22. See Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913).

23. See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
24. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
25. Id. at 386.
26. Justice Day's emphasis on the procedural requirements of the fourth
amendment warrant clause may be a foreshadowing of the later realist jurispru-

dence, but his focus on the marhsall's trespass is nevertheless consistent with
the property orientation of Boyd Id at 393-94.
27. 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
28. 1& at 309.
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dividual privacy through the principles enunciated in Boyd, Weeks,
and Gouled.
Unfortunately, because the sphere of privacy which emerged
depended largely on traditional concepts of property for its definition, modem technical devices, such as wiretaps, presented
problems the property perspective did not readily address. Olmstead v. United States-9 brought before the Court a situation in
which no material property had been seized and no physical trespass had occurred, but a telephone wiretap was used to overhear
defendant's conversations. Under the literal application of Boyd
and Weeks, the Court held that no warrant was required and admit30
ted the conversations into evidence.
Olmstead failed to obtain protection because the Court applied
the property doctrine developed in the Boyd-Gouled line of cases in
a conservative and formalistic way. 31 Justices Brandeis and
Holmes, dissenting separately, avoided a formalistic analysis.32 Justice Holmes specifically abandoned the use of "logical deduction
from established rules" 33 to find a solution, and instead attempted
to balance the competing interests of detecting criminals and
34
preventing government itself from fostering or committing crime.
Justice Brandeis, who emphasized that the Court had continually
reinterpreted the Constitution, identified personal privacy, rather
than property, as the central value underlying the fourth amendment guarantees. 35 Justice Brandeis' argument was a pragmatic
one, and, his opinion, as well as Justice Holmes', signaled the development of a realist approach which was destined to replace the old
36
formalism.
Justice Butler also dissented, using formalistic reasoning to
reach a conclusion quite opposite to that of the Chief Justice.3 7 He
argued persuasively that there existed a common law property right
in the intangible conversations and telephone wires involved in the
29. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
30. Id. at 465-66.
31. 1I at 442-43, 468 (court held that evidence to be excluded should be
confined to cases where admission would violate constitutional rights).
32. Justice Holmes dissented but refused to find the defendant to be covered by the penumbra of the fourth and fifth amendments. Id. at 469 (J., dissenting). Justice Brandeis' dissent rested largely on the "unclean hands"
doctrine. Id at 483 n.16.
33. Id. at 470.

34. Id
35. Id at 473.
36. Id. at 471-85.
37. Justice Butler concluded that the fourth amendment "safeguards
against all evils that are like and equivalent to those embraced within the ordinary meaning of its words." Id,at 488 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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case.3 8 Further, the government, by tapping the lines, had "literally" seized property in which it could claim no special title and the
conversations, therefore, should have been excluded according to
the Boyd principles. It should be noted in retrospect that Justice
Butler refused to limit his analysis solely to physical invasions of
privacy in the Boyd opinion. 39 Unfortunately, in Olmstead, Justice
Butler was alone in attempting to reach a decision based completely
40
on the individual's sphere of absolute property rights.
By the 1930's, the old formalist approach, characterized by the
controlling opinion of Chief Justice Taft in Olmstead, was beginning to give way to the newer jurisprudential theory of legal realism. This pragmatic emphasis resulted in a shift away from
"stultifying metaphysics" and toward "social engineering. '4 1 One
of the casualties of the shift was the Boyd and Gouled premise that
private papers and other property were absolutely beyond the government's reach. 42 The total protection for any item which fell
within common law property concepts was whittled down through a
series of cases in which the Court allowed the police to seize an
ever-expanding category of "instrumentalities" of crime, as opposed
43
to mere evidence, where there was a search incident to an arrest.
A gradual shift in determining the admissibility of evidence by
analyzing the manner in which it was obtained, rather than its nature, marked a crucial turning point in the understanding of the
fourth amendment's purpose. The old notion of absolute property
rights gave way to an interpretation of the reasonableness clause.
In 1967, the Court applied its new fourth amendment focus by
overruling Olmstead in the case of Katz v. United States.44 In Katz,
federal agents operating without a warrant attached a listening device to the outside of a public telephone booth and recorded incriminating information concerning the defendant's gambling activities.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, flatly rejected the Boyd
doctrine of "constitutionally protected areas" as being deceptive
and misguided. 45 Justice Stewart noted that:
[T]he fourth amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
38. Id. at 487 (Butler, J., dissenting).
39. 116 U.S. at 630.
40. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485-88.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 42-57 for a discussion of how the
Court gradually abandoned the old formalist approach.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 19, 20.
43. See, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), where the Court
allowed the seizure of account books and papers not described in the search
warrant.

44. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
45. Id. at 350.
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a subject of fourth amendment protection. . . . But what he seeks to
preserve as private, even in
46 an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.
Justice Stewart's emphasis was on whether Katz justifiably relied on his privacy. The critical question did not focus on a "place,"
but rather on Katz's personal intent. A more subjective test of justifiable expectations supplanted the earlier and more objective standard which focused on a "place." While the change may have been
due to the Court's desire to overcome the apparently narrow confines of Olmstead and expand constitutionally protected privacy, it
was grievously flawed by not being rooted in either societal norms
or constitutional text.
Justice Harlan, concurring, attempted to provide some rational
justification for this new standard by adding a second element to
the test:
My understanding of the rule (i.e., "the fourth amendment protects
people, not places") that has emerged from prior decisions is that there
is a two-fold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable." Thus, a
man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy,
but objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the "plain view"
of outsiders are not "protected"
because no intention to keep them to
47
himself has been exhibited.
Although Justice Harlan's addition to the Katz test was a welcome step toward providing an empirical element-reasonableness
as determined by society-to the subjective one Justice Stewart created, the test itself nevertheless suffered from the risk of opening
fourth amendment guarantees to considerable dilution. Professor
Amsterdam rightly observed that:
[a]n actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in
a statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the fourth amendment protects. It can neither add to, nor can its absence detract from,
an individual's claim to fourth amendment protection. If it could, the
government could diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and that we were all
forthwith being placed
48
under comprehensive electronic surveillance.
Undoubtedly, Justice Harlan was grasping toward a return to the
Boyd-fostered doctrine of constitutionally protected areas. He was
seeking to combine the importance of a "place" with an individual's
expectations of privacy. For example, he emphasized that, "[t]he
question is what protection it (the fourth amendment) affords to
46. Id. at 351.
47. Id. at 361.
48. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV.
349 (1974).
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those people. Generally, as here, the answer to that question requires reference to a 'place.'
One year after Katz, the Court elaborated on this new doctrine
in Terry v. Ohio.50 The Court stated that "wherever an individual
may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy'. . . he is entitled
to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.151 The Terry
Court further stated that "the specific content and incidents of this
right (of privacy) must be shaped by the context in which it is
",49

asserted.

'52

It is fair to say that although the post-Katz Court did not abandon all property considerations in its fourth amendment protection
formula, the role of property aspects-ownership, possession, occupancy-was unquestionably devalued. Instead of serving as legal
touchstones for the amendment, these aspects came to be merely
flexible standards by which expectations of privacy might be
considered.

53

49. 389 U.S. at 361.
50. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
51. Id. at 9.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. The problem with merging a traditional "property" approach and a
"reasonable expectations" approach in an understanding of privacy becomes
very clear in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). In Rakas, passengers in a car
claimed standing to raise fourth amendment exclusionary rule protections analogized their position to that of the defendant in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257 (1960), where Jones was present in a friend's apartment at the time of a
search. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 140-42. As an extension of the property principle, the
Court had ruled that "anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs
may challenge its legality." Jones, 362 U.S. at 267. In denying the Rakas petitioners similar rights, Justice Rehnquist, for the Court, attempted to limit Jones
in the following manner:
We think that Jones on its facts merely stands for the unremarkable
proposition that a person can have a legally sufficient interest in a place
other than his own home so that the Fourth Amendment protects him
from unreasonable governmental intrusion into that place. See Jones, 362
U.S. at 263, 265. In defining the scope of that interest, we adhere to the
view expressed in Jones and echoed in later cases that arcane distinctions
developed in property and tort law between guests, licencees, invitees, and
the like, ought not to control. (Citations omitted.) But the Jones statement
that a person need only be "legitimately on premises" in order to challenge
the validity of the search of a dwelling place cannot be taken in its full
sweep beyond the facts of that case.
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 142-43.
Concurring, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, sought to distinguish the "reasonableness" factor in Rakas from that of Jones by suggesting
that the privacy expectation for automobiles was always treated differently
from the expectation in other locations, id at 154, and noting that "[n]one of the
passengers [in Rakas] is said to have had control of the vehicle or the keys." Id
at 155.
Finally, Justice White wrote a dissent in which Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens joined. He began by noting that "[T]he Court today holds that the
Fourth Amendment protects property, not people, and specifically that a legitimate occupant of an automobile may not invoke the exclusionary rule and chal-
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In this same period, the Court also abandoned the property-focused mere evidence rule in Warden v. Hayden.54 Justice Brennan
explicitly substituted a "privacy" orientation for the fourth amendment in place of the "discredited" property rationale. 55 The rejection in Hayden and Katz of the property principles of earlier cases
enabled the Court to extend protection to tapped phone conversations, but it also allowed the seizure of evidence clearly not impli56
cating the "privacies of life."
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has maintained Katz's
liberal understanding of the fourth amendment right of privacy, but
nonetheless, has afforded less than liberal protection for personal
privacy. The cause of this decline in personal privacy protection can
be traced to the predominently "law and order" membership of the
High Bench which has extended the number of exceptions to the
warrant requirement and has relaxed the standard for probable
lenge a search of that vehicle unless he happens to own or have a possessory

interest in it." Id. at 156. Then he drew upon two established doctrines to support Rakas' claim. The first was recognition of "some cognizable level of privacy in the interior of an automobile," id. at 157, and the second was that "when
a person is legitimately present in a private place, his right to privacy is protected from unreasonable governmental interference even if he does not own
the premises." Id. at 157-58.
The reasonableness-property problem is ultimately compounded in Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). In Rawlings, petitioner, also claiming
fourth amendment standing, was one of several visitors in a home at the time of
its search. Id. at 100. In the course of events, some $4500 worth of drugs were
discovered in the purse of another visitor and petitioner promptly admitted
ownership of them. Id. at 101. Again, as in Rakas, Justice Rehnquist wrote for
the Court in denying Rawlings' standing; he found, as the lower Kentucky
courts had, that Rawlings had not sustained his burden of proving that he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the purse of the other visitor. Id. at 104.
Petitioner's further claim to standing, based upon ownership of the drugs, was
dismissed with a reference to the earlier case: "While petitioner's ownership of
the drugs is undoubtedly one fact to be considered in this case, Rakas emphatically rejected the notion that 'arcane' concepts of property law ought to control
the ability to claim the protections of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 105.
The dissenters, Justices Marshall and Brennan, took issue directly with the
Court's reading of Rakas:
No Fourth Amendment claim based on an interest in the property
seized was before the Court, [in Rakas], and, consequently, the Court did
not and could not have decided whether such a claim could be maintained.
In fact, the Court expressly disavowed any intention to foreclose such a
claim ("[t]his is not to say that such casual visitors could not contest the
lawfulness of the seizure of the evidence of the search if their own property
were seized during the search," 439 U.S. at 142, n.11), and suggested its continuing validity ("[P]etitioners' claims must fail. They asserted neither a
property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interestin the
property seized," id. at 148 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 115 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
55. Id at 304.
56. 387 U.S. at 305.
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cause. 57
The interrelationship of property and privacy which framed
Justice Bradley's opinion in Boyd was neglected and, in cases such

as Hayden, was eliminated altogether. In reducing the importance
of the property concept and abandoning Olmstead's methodological
use of technical property doctrines to protect privacy interests, the

Court departed from what could have been, and should be, a useful
tool for absolutely protecting a core of personal privacy under the
reasonableness clause of the fourth amendment.
MODERN PRACTICE

As the Court reduced the linkage between privacy and property, the government expanded its role in the lives of Americans,
causing a heightened sensitivity to the need for privacy. Thus,
courts began to look upon calls for privacy protection sympathetically. Since the 1965 landmark birth control case of Griswold v.
Connecticut,5 8 the Supreme Court has developed a line of decisions
involving the creation and expansion of a constitutionally guaranteed right of personal privacy. The Justices have openly debated
that right's relationship to the constitutional text. Some have attributed the privacy right to a cluster of amendments in the Bill of
Rights, 59 others to a substantive right required by due process of
law, 60 and still others have considered it a right reserved to the people by the ninth amendment. 61 Because of the confusion over the
connection between the right and the text, and indeed confusion
over the controlling principle on which the right supposedly rests,
there has been a common misapprehension that the right to privacy
cases rest on legislative policy, rather than underlying judicial
concepts.
Many critics have pointed out that the Court has also moved
beyond the realm of privacy and into that of autonomy through the
vehicle of sexual freedom cases. This shift is largely due to a loss of
textual moorings. It can be argued that Griswold at least attempted
a grounding in text through Justice Douglas' use of "penumbras"
stemming from the "zones of privacy" found in the first, third,
fourth, fifth, and (without explanation) the ninth amendments.
57. For a full analysis of the Court's post-Katz activities, see D. O'BRIEN,
(1979).
58. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY

59. See, e.g., Synder v. Massachusetts, 219 U.S. 97 (1935). The due process
clause of the Bill of Rights was established to protect those liberties that are "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Id. at 105.
60. See supra note 2.
61. See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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The Court, however, moved away from reliance on any or all of
these possible supports by 1973 in the momentous and controversial
abortion case of Roe v. Wade.62 This change, which has a parallel in
the earlier Boyd-to-Katz-to-Hayden metamorphosis, is worth
tracing.
In Griswold, the Warren Court analyzed explicit provisions of
the Bill of Rights to recognize a right of privacy peculiar to the facts
of the case. 63 Although it moved beyond specific constitutional provisions, it did so by relying upon rights penumbral to those expressly guaranteed. Justice Douglas' majority opinion focused upon
questions of enforcement of Connecticut's anti-contraceptive statute and by so doing, avoided the pitfall of asserting judicial values
or those of society in order to strike down the substantive policy
under review. Even with this case, it must be noted that Justice
Douglas reached his concept of constitutionally protected "zones of
privacy" by citing examples from five different amendments, 64 thus
65
at least opening the way for later interpretive imprecision.
At the time of Griswold, Connecticut's neighboring state of
Massachusetts had a contraceptive statute which, because it did not
deal with "use," was unaffected by the 1965 ruling. One year later,
advocates of birth control succeeded in lobbying the Massachusetts
legislature to amend the law permitting physicians to prescribe contraceptives to married people. Nevertheless, William Baird, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,66 challenged the amended statute because it still
penalized a layman for exhibiting or distributing contraceptives.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, held the statute invalid on equal protection grounds.6 7 Dismissing the Commonwealth's assertion that the objectives of the law were to protect
62. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. Griswold, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). At issue in Griswold was the constitutionality of a state statute banning the use of contraceptives, even by a married
couple, in the privacy of their home, pursuant to their physician's prescribing
the contraceptives. In its decision, the Court limited consideration to married
couples.
64. Id. at 482.
65. Indeed, in the same case, Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion relied
exclusively on the text of the ninth amendment. See 381 U.S. at 486-99.
66. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). Baird was convicted for exhibiting and distributing contraceptives because he was not a physician or pharmacist. His conviction was sustained by the highest Massachusetts court (on
distribution grounds alone). Commonwealth v. Baird, 355 Mass. 746, 247 N.E.2d
574 (1969). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Baird v. Massachusetts, 396 U.S. 1029 (1970). Thereafter, Baird challenged his conviction in a
habeus corpus action before the federal district court for Massachusetts. His
petition was denied, Baird v. Eisenstadt, 310 F. Supp. 951 (D. Mass. 1970), but he
was successful in gaining an invalidation of the statute on substantive due process grounds in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. Baird
v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398 (1st Cir. 1970).
67. Eisenstadt,405 U.S. at 454-55.

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 18:847

health and morals, Justice Brennan surmised that the "real reason"
behind the statute was the opposition to contraception per se. From
this, the Court concluded that a distinction between married and
unmarried persons was irrational. 68 The Court thus made a major
leap in privacy doctrine evolution. While admitting that "in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship, ' 69 the Court nonetheless formulated a new, general right
of privacy, not focused on the procedural incidents of a challenged
regulation, not based on the Bill of Rights, and not limited to married couples. The Court explained this new concept of individual
privacy:
the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart
of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting
a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
70
child.
For several reasons, Eisenstadt failed to receive much notice, in
spite of its trail-blazing nature. As mentioned, only four of the nine
members of the Court supported Justice Brennan's views. Additionally, his definition of privacy was not crucial to the resolution of
the case and the Massachusetts law was unique among the states.
Finally, by the time the decision was rendered, Roe v. Wade 7' had
already been argued.
Justice Blackmun, writing for six justices in Roe, listed eight
cases, including Griswold, in which the Court or individual Justices
had found a right of personal privacy to be protected by the Constitution. Five additional cases, including Eisenstadt, were cited for
establishing that the "right has some extension to activities relating
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and
child rearing and education. ' 72 From these few cases, most of them
dealing with particular fourth or fourteenth amendment rights, the
Court derived a general right of "personal privacy. '73 Even this
brief bow to textually related precedents was cast aside in Roe, for
in the very next paragraph of his opinion, Justice Blackmun eschewed the efforts of his colleagues to locate privacy dimensions in
the Bill of Rights. Justice Blackmun expounded that the majority
"feel" a general right of privacy is "founded in the fourteenth
amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state
68. Id. at 454-55.
69. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).

70. Id
71. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
72. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53.

73. Id.
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actions."
Finally, unencumbered by textual restraints, the Roe Court
was able to address the real problem at hand: concern for a woman's autonomy when faced with the question of abortion. 75 Thus,
by the mid-1970's, the idea of personal privacy existed without solid
constitutional grounding, and the concept itself had become confused with autonomy, the latter right of self-determination sometimes being substituted for the former right to be let alone. It was
predictable that the Court would have trouble distinguishing between its holdings in cases which presented privacy issues, such as
Stanley v. Georgia,76 where it held that a state may not prosecute a
person for possession of obscene materials in his home, and those
77
cases which presented autonomy issues, such as Kelley v. Johnson,
where the Court held that a county police department need only
show a "rational basis" in order to uphold a regulation limiting the
style and length of a policeman's hair.
More importantly, the Court was free to apply its new, unanchored doctrine of privacy, or autonomy, to a host of cases over the
next five years which resulted in decisions whose only pattern of
consistency was derived from the combination of personal predilictions which stamped the majority opinions. In short, the same root
problem of applying a text-free approach which marked the Court's
activities in the review of economic regulations in the 1905-1937 period, now haunts the modern Court in the area of personal privacy.
FORMING A PROPERTY-AUTONOMY LINKAGE

Although the Supreme Court has waffled in its application of
the "property bias" in the traditional fourth and fifth amendment
area of criminal law, as related to privacy, its complete abandonment in the newer realm of autonomy decisions is more serious because of two unhealthy results. 78 First, the Court has run a zig-zag
course through post-Roe cases causing excessive litigation rather
than resolving sensitive issues.79 Second, the Court's decisions have
74. Id.
75. Id. at 153-54.
76. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
77. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
78. Justice Stevens refered to this distinction between traditional and modern types of privacy interests in his majority opinion in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.
589, 599 (1977). "The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy' have
in fact involved at least two different kinds of interests. One is the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
79. Id. at 598-600. Recent lower court decisions have mirrored the uncertainty of the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Andrade v. City of Phoe-
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not served the cause of civil liberties well.80
The creation of property orientation in the treatment of autonomy questions would help alleviate the problems noted above. A
simple scheme, making use of the Court's "two tier" approach to
judicial scrutiny of challenged statutes,8 ' could involve the designation of property into two classifications, exclusive and non-exclusive. The first designation would apply to the ownership,
possession, or occupancy of property used for personal purposes.
The second designation would include public and private property
used in public ways. The essential difference between the two is
that the first carries with it a customary, community-shared expectation of privacy associated with the place while the second does
nix, 692 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1982); Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School
Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 425 U.S. 559 (1976); Fisher v.
Snyder, 476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Scott v. Macy, 349 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Briggs v. North Muskegon Police Dept., 563 F. Supp. 585 (W.D. Mich. 1983);
Baron v. Meloni, 556 F. Supp. 796 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Swope v. Bratton, 541 F.
Supp. 99 (W.D. Ark. 1982); Suddarth v. Slane, 539 F. Supp. 612 (W.D. Va. 1982);
Shuman v. City of Philadelphia, 470 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Wilson v.
Swing, 463 F. Supp. 555 (M.D. N.C. 1978); Smith v. Price, 446 F. Supp. 828 (M.D.
Ga. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 616 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980); Hollenbaugh v.
Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 578 F.2d 1374
(3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Major
v. Hampton, 413 F. Supp. 66 (E.D. La. 1976); Drake v. Covington County Board
of Education, 371 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Ala. 1974) (three-judge court); Mindel v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 312 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Cal. 1970). See also
Phillips v. Bergland, 586 F.2d 1007, 1011 (4th Cir. 1978); Norton v. Macy, 417
F.2d 1161, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Meehan v. Macy, 392 F.2d 822, 834-35, 837 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), reh'g granted, 425 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (remanded with directions); Taylor v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 374 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir.
1967).
80. Indicative of the rather cavaliere approach to civil liberties taken by the
Court is the recent denial of a writ of certiorari is Whisenhunt v. Spradlin, 52
U.S.L.W. 3366 (1983). Petitioners, a patrolwoman and a police sergeant, were
suspended from their jobs, and the sergeant was also demoted to patrolman
because they dated and spent several nights together. The punishments were
imposed even though the department failed to provide them with any reasonable warning that their conduct was prohibited and failed to come forward with
any evidence that the activity adversely affected their job performance. Indeed,
the sergeant had taken the precaution of asking his immediate supervisor about
the propriety of the couple's activities before serious dating commenced, noting
that they might spend some nights together. The supervisor's response was
that it would be "fine, (but) I didn't want the two of them setting up housekeeping." Accordingly, they continued to maintain separate residences. Id. at 3367.
81. Two levels of judicial scrutiny evolved from the famous fourth footnote
in the case of United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
Basically, a lower tier came to be adopted for economic regulations legislation,
in which the presumption would lie in favor of a statute's constitutionality as
long as a plausible rationale could be accepted as a "rational basis" for an interference with private rights. A higher tier was established for legislation which
appeared to violate a specific prohibition of the Constitution, or which restricted political processes which serve to bring about the repeal of undesirable
legislation, or which reflected prejudice against "discrete and insular minorities." In the latter cases, the legislative body would have to demonstrate a
"compelling interest" in interfering with the right asserted.
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not. A crucial feature of this distinction, therefore, is whether the
public has access to the property. Examples of exclusive property
would be one's home, one's body, a reserved motel room, a camping
tent in a campground, a massage parlor, and an enclosed stall in a
restroom. Non-exclusive property would include theaters, parks,
fields, public restrooms, and schools. Finally, challenged statutes
involving privacy rights related to the first classification of property
(exclusive) would trigger the "strict scrutiny" test, requiring the
legislature to demonstrate a "compelling interest" in regulating
those rights. Statutes permitting interferences with rights related
to the second classification (non-exclusive) would survive if the legislature satisfied the less stringent "rational basis" test.
What follows is a capsule summary of recent leading autonomy
cases. In each the reasoning and outcome will be presented as if the
courts had utilized a property orientation in the treatment of these
autonomy issues.
PRIVACY DECISIONS AND THE PROPERTY PERSPECTIVE
82
Reinforcing the right to an abortion declared in Roe v. Wade,
the Supreme Court in PlannedParenthoodof Central Missouri v.
Danforth,8 3 invalidated several provisions of a Missouri statute.
Two of the provisions included the requirements that, for an abortion, an unmarried woman under 18 must have her parents' consent
and a married woman of any age must have her husband's consent.
Although the decision correctly recognizes the exclusiveness of a
woman's privacy claim regarding her own body, the Court's suggestion that parents have legitimate, cognizable interests in the abortion decision is rather troubling. The Court stated that:
[W]e are not unaware of the deep and proper concern and interest that
a devoted and protective husband has in his wife's pregnancy and in
the growth and development of the fetus she is carrying. Neither has
this Court failed to appreciate the importance of the marital relationship in our society.84

The Court undertook a balancing of possibly conflicting interests of man and woman in the abortion decision, concluding that the
balancing weighs in the woman's favor "inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is more directly and
immediately affected by the pregnancy.18 5 As in Roe, however, the
Court failed to attach the autonomy interest of the woman in controlling her body to a firm conceptual base.
82.
83.
84.
85.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
428 U.S. 52 (1976).
Id. at 69.
Id at 71.
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Relying heavily upon Eisenstadt v. Baird,8 6 the Court determined in Carey v. PopulationServices International,7 that a "decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart" of
constitutionally protected rights of privacy.8 8 Accordingly, it struck
down a New York statute that made it a crime (1) for any person to
sell or distribute contraceptives to minors, (2) for anyone other
than a licensed pharmacist to distribute contraceptives to persons
over 16, and (3) for anyone to advertise or display contraceptives.
Even though it was a plurality decision, Carey served to buttress an
autonomy-based privacy formulation by protecting freedom of
choice over reproduction in the realm of minors' sexual activity, an
area not yet within accepted social mores.
Although the Court's holding was correct, its reliance upon Eisenstadt, a case devoid of conceptual moorings, was unsound. Particularly disturbing is a footnote which stated flatly that
constitutional privacy had never been found to protect the private
consensual sexual relations of adults.8 9 To be sure, the Court has
never squarely addressed that question and the Carey note was not
a misstatement of privacy law. But it is troublesome because the
motives behind it are not clear. It is arguable that the statement
was merely a response to Justice Powell's expressed concern that
any attempted state regulation of sexual conduct might trigger the
strict scrutiny standard of review. 9° On the other hand, the footnote may suggest that a privacy right does not necessarily protect
private sexual relations, particularly those of gay men and women.
If the latter interpretation is correct, then it follows that the reproductive autonomy of minors and unmarried individuals is protected
only because it is incidental to the protection of marital privacy. In
short, Carey fails to produce a clear, independent basis for protection of consensual sexual conduct per se.
The Court did not lack opportunities to address the problem of
privacy and sexual relations. In the term preceding Carey, the
Court summarily affirmed without opinion the lower court's ruling
in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond,9 1
86. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
87. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
88. Id. at 685.
89. The "Court has not definitively answered the difficult question whether
and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulating [private
consensual sexual] behavior among adults .... and we do not purport to answer
that question now." Id. at 688 n.5.
90. "The Court apparently would subject all state regulation affecting adult
sexual relations to the strictest standard of judicial review. . . . In my view,
the extraordinary protection the Court would give to all personal decisions in
matters of sex is neither required by the Constitution nor supported by our
prior decisions." Id. at 703 (Powell, J., concurring).
91. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), qffd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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holding that the right of privacy did not protect homosexuals in
their form of sexual expression. The Court ruled that the privacy
right only protected the private sexual activity of married hetero92
sexual couples.
The Court should require strict scrutiny of all state regulations
monitoring private, adult consensual sexual relations. Thus, the
Court would have to find a compelling state interest for the regulation. The requirement of this strict standard is reasonable because
these sexual relationships are typically confined to private property
with no public access. In Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library,93
two employees of a state-maintained library were discharged because they lived together and bore a child through an adulterous
relationship. The district court found that under a minimum rationality cest, there was no violation of the equal protection clause.
The court further found that the constitutional right of privacy did
not encompass the couple's behavior. 94 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed on the basis of the lower
court opinion and the Court denied the plaintiff's petition for writ
of certiorari. Justice Marshall wrote a vigorous dissent, arguing
that:
Such administrative intermeddling with important personal rights
merits more than minimal scrutiny. One such right, clearly implicated
by petitioners' discharge, is that 'of the individual ... to engage in any
of the common occupations of life' (citations omitted). Perhaps even
more vital is 'the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances,
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.' (citations
omitted). Although we never have demarcated the precise boundaries
of this right, we have held that it broadly encompasses 'freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life.' (citations omitted)
Petitioners' rights to pursue an open rather than a clandestine personal relationship and to rear their child together in this environment
closely resemble the other aspects of personal
privacy to which we
95
have extended constitutional protection.
Although Justice Marshall was altering the grounds upon which he
thought the case should be decided, it is clear that his sympathies

moved him to greatly expand the constitutional protection of personal decisions in sexual matters.
Before moving to other areas of autonomy decisions, it should
be noted that Doe, Hollenbaugh, and other such cases are disturbing
in that they reinforce the idea that the protections afforded in Carey and Danforth exist only because the conduct involved is typi92. Id. at 1202.
93. 436 F. Supp. 1328 (W.D. Pa. 1977), affd mem., 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1979).
94. Id.at 1334.
95. Hollenbaugh, 439 U.S. 1052, 1054-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
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cally associated with the marital context. Accordingly, it implies a
serious limitation in both the Court's allegiance to autonomy-based
rights and in its willingness to vindicate the privacy right of minority groups which should ostensibly form the core of a civil right.
In ParisAdult Theater I v. Slayton, 96 the Court attempted to
curtail the effects of its Stanley decision. In Slayton, the Court upheld an injunction against the commercial exhibition of pornographic films in an adults-only theater, making it clear that the
privacy right would not encompass such public exhibitions: "This
privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of
the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation and child
rearing." 97 It is clear from this statement that the marital context
is important to Chief Justice Burger and his majority opinion colleagues. Interestingly, the Court's use of the term "intimacies" also
seems to suggest that a "place" has particular relevance when drawing the privacy line. This is even more apparent later in the opinion
when the Court noted that intimacy is the basis for extending privacy rights to "the doctor's office, the hospital, the hotel room, or as
otherwise required to safeguard the right to intimacy involved. Obviously, there is no necessary or legitimate expectation of privacy
which would extend to marital intercourse on a street corner or a
theater stage."98 Although the Court was correct in distinguishing
a public theater from one's home for privacy purposes, there is a
critical underlying difference between a property-based concept of
privacy and one based upon "intimacy," which is essentially a notion of expectations. 99
A related suggestion that privacy is a place-bound right, limited
to the familial sphere of the home, was made in United States v.
Orito.'°° In Orito, the Court ruled that Congress may forbid the
interstate transportation of certain pornographic materials for the
transporter's private use because the zone of privacy does not extend beyond the home. Similarly, in United States v. 12,200-ft. Reels
of Super 8MM. Film,1 0 1 the Court upheld Congress' power to prohibit the importation of contraband into the United States, even
though the contraband was for the importer's private personal use.
The Court's reasoning in these transportation cases is questionable.
Obviously, personally addressed and stamped mail should be considered private property of an exclusive nature. Further, there is a
96. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).

97. Id. at 65. A similar recital was issued in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600
n.26 (1977).
98.
99.
100.
101.

Slayton, 413 U.S. at 66 n.13 (citations omitted).
See supra note 22.
413 U.S. 139 (1973).
413 U.S. 123 (1973).
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seductive logic in the notion that the right to read or to observe
materials in private (Stanley) necessarily carries with it a corollary
right to purchase such materials. 0 2 Nevertheless, in the Court's
defense, Congress can muster considerable authority under the
commerce clause. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that materials in
transit have not yet come into one's possession and, therefore, they
do not enjoy the special level of protection the exclusive private
property concept affords.
Lovisi v. SlaytonI0 3 is a classic example of a place-oriented linedrawing dilemma in the privacy realm. The Lovisi couple and another person got together at the Lovisi's home and engaged in a
number of sexual acts, some of which were photographed. These
activities came to the police's attention when the Lovisi's children
took several of the pictures to school. Both the district court and
the court of appeals applied an "expectations" analysis in deciding
to affirm the convictions. Judge Mehrige, for the district court, argued that consenting adults-married or single-have a protected
right of privacy in sexual activity, even with the presence of a third
party. That right was waived, however, when the couple failed to
protect themselves in allowing pictures to be taken:
By electing to photograph their sexual relations, thus creating the possibility that the intimacy of their acts would be destroyed by future
viewing by others, the Lovisis took upon themselves an especially
heavy burden to protect their privacy. They did not meet that burden
...because 10of4 their failure to deny other persons access to the
photographs.

Again, the "expectations" test, under the guise of "intimacy," is
attractive but insufficient. The logic of Judge Mehrige's position
might lead to the conclusion the court of appeals reached, that the
invitation to include a third party in the activity constituted a
waiver of privacy. The rational position is simply that the Lovisis'
exclusive right to privacy, regardless of the number of "invited
guests" involved, is overcome only at the point where the pictures
are produced for public scrutiny in the school. In other words, it is
the home's border that renders one kind of property distinguishable
from another.
102. In response to this argument Chief Justice Burger stated that:
The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolutionary development of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third, fourth, or fifth
'logical' extension occurs. Each step, when taken, appeared a reasonable
step in relation to that which preceded it, although the aggregate or end
result is one that would never have been seriously considered in the first
instance.
Id. at 127.
103. 363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973).
104. Id. at 627.
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Two other cases, Smayda v. United States 0 5 and People v.
Triggs,1° 6 combine to further demonstrate the confusion which can
arise with application of the "expectations" formula. Both cases involved homosexual activity in public restrooms which clandestine
law enforcement officers observed. The only factual distinction between the cases is that in Smayda the toilet stall where the act was
committed had a door whereas in Triggs the stall did not. The
Triggs court found for the defendants, arguing that the officers had
no articulable reasons for believing that the individuals involved
were about to perform forbidden acts.' 0 7 Further, their peering
into the stall constituted an unjustified invasion of the defendants'
privacy.
The Smayda court reached a contrary conclusion. It held that
the appellants vitiated their claim to privacy either because one, if
there had been a search they had impliedly consented to it, or because two, there not having been an actual invasion of the area of
the stall, there had been no search.1 08 The first line of reasoning
seems unpersuasive because any use of a restroom stall would carry
with it some expectation of privacy, and the second approach is contrary to the holding in Katz. 0 9
The holding in Smayda should be reversed. Under the "exclusive" and "non-exclusive" approach urged here, the question of
whether a stall has a door is critical. It is that feature which enables an individual to gain total control and possession of his surroundings thus creating an exclusive, albeit temporary, propertybased claim to privacy.
Another noteworthy case, People v. Livermore," ° serves to illustrate the formula proposed here. In Livermore, state police were
called to investigate a disturbance emanating from a tent in a public
campground. The officers approached the tent, identified themselves, and, upon receiving no response, unzipped the tent flap and
discovered two female occupants engaging in sexual activity. Petitioners were subsequently arrested and convicted of violating the
state's gross indecency statute. They appealed, claiming that the
tent was being usea as a residence and was not, therefore, a "public
place." The appeliate court, on the basis of statutory construction,
affirmed the conviction.1 'L The court's holding was correct because
105. 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
106. 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
107. Id. at 235-37, 106 Cal. Rptr.. at 410-11.
108. Smayda, 352 F.2d at 256-57.

109. In fairness, it should be noted that Smayda was decided two years prior
to Katz v. United States. See supra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
110. 9 Mich. App. 47, 155 N.W.2d 711 (1968).
111. Id
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although a tent should be considered a residence, the activity that
takes place inside it is not totally immune to governmental encroachment. In Livermore, the privacy protection gave way when
the actions of the petitioners disturbed the peace. With that disturbance, the police justifiably opened the tent flap and charged the
occupants with "gross indecency."
Finally, the Supreme Court in Kelley v. Johnson112 was asked
to review a county regulation limiting the length of a county policeman's hair. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, determined
that the regulation did not violate any asserted fourteenth amendment right.1 13 The Court gave considerable deference to the legislature and allowed the county virtually free rein to determine the
nature of the "uniform" and general appearance of its police officers despite Justice Marshall's dissent that:
To say that the liberty guarantee of the fourteenth amendment does
not encompass matters of personal appearance would be fundamentally inconsistent with the values of privacy, self-identity, autonomy,
and personal integrity that I have always assumed the Constitution
was designed to protect. 114
Justice Marshall's view is commendable because the control of
one's person is unquestionably an "exclusive" form of property
which should require the government to satisfy the "compelling interest" test.
CONCLUSION

The decline of a property-related standard of privacy over the
last half century combined with the recent surge of interest in personal protection from governmental encroachment has caused the
Supreme Court to wrestle continuously with these personal autonomy cases. Unfortunately, it appears that no firm constitutional
standard has been constructed to replace the earlier fourth amendment orientation. The Court has shifted away from the property
orientation of the fourth amendment in Katz and related cases with
the clear intent of widening the protective umbrella for individuals.
Ironically, the net result has been a weakening of the constitutional
right of privacy, especially in matters of autonomy. Consequently,
the cause of strengthening the civil rights of individuals has not
been well served and the Court's inconsistency has generated unnecessary litigation and confusion in the lower courts. In place of
the new privacy emphasis on "expectations," "intimacy," "familial
or marital rights," or simply a vague notion of "liberty" as contained in the fourteenth amendment, the Supreme Court should re112. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
113. Id. at 247-49.
114. Id. at 251 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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turn to an expanded concept of property as a basis for asserting
constitutionally protected privacy claims. This necessary return
would further the aims of enhancing personal privacy and provide
greater predictability in an important area of constitutional law.

